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NOTRE DAME
LAWYER
A Quarterly Law Review
VOL. XV

MAY, 1940

-NO. 4

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PRESENT WAR*

T

HE final outbreak of the war in Europe last September
after months of apprehension and threatening naturally
caused a disruption profoundly affecting all international relations, both in the East and in the West, both among belligerents and neutrals.
In addition to this appalling catastrophe and as a consequence thereof, most important legislation has within the
last weeks been enacted by our Congress. This legislation is
termed "neutrality legislation," but is in effect the enactment of a new American policy in dealing with a great
European war which threatens to become world-wide. The
object of the policy is to preserve America from entanglement in that war and to avoid what are generally thought to
have been the unfortunate causes which led to our entry into
the World War (1917). This new law would be more accurately termed an American defense legislation. It is revolutionary in its character in that it abandons the so-called policy of the freedom of the seas, so long maintained by the
United States and for which the nation entered into war with
Great Britain in 1812 as it did with Germany in 1917.
It is quite natural, therefore, that under these circumstances the attention of the public should be diverted from
*This address was first published in the NEw YORK LAW JOURNAL of November
30, 1939, and is republished here with permission of that publication.
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the great and pressing problems of American domestic policy
toward the more imminent and probably more dangerous
problems of international relationships. For that reason international law, a subject little understood and considered
but by very few, has come to the forefront in our public discussions. The whole matter of neutrality and the rights and
duties of neutrals as regards belligerents was the subject of
very protracted and very complete debate in the Senate of
the United States. Under these circumstances its seems particularly opportune for those who are entering upon a career
of the law to give attention to those problems of international
law which so profoundly affect our own country.'
Let me first call attention to the widespread belief that
international law is very different from national law in that
it is wholly vague, uncertain and without sanction. This
assumption is not really founded upon fact, and is due to
the use of international law in too loose a sense. Let us consider what international law is generally and then how its
particular rules relating to war - an abnormal state of affairs - may differ in precision from those applying to a
state of peace.
International law, roughly speaking, may be said to be
the gerieral agreement among nations as to certain rules
governing their conduct in time of peace and in time of war.
In time of peace .these extend to a vast variety of questions
constantly under discussion between governments through
methods of diplomacy, through international arbitrations and
through courts, such as the Permanent Court of International
Justice at The Hague. Moreover, international law has been
said from the earliest time in this country by the Supreme
Court to be part of the common law and hence of American
law, and has been acted upon consistently and repeatedly by
the courts of the United States throughout the history of the
nation. The enforcement of international law is also dependent upon the consent of nations, but this consent has usually
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been-given, and I know of no judgment of an arbitral tribunal
which has not been honored by the losing party.
The Committee on International Law of the American
Bar Association submitted a list of over five hundred cases
in the courts of the forty-eight states of the American Union
in which questions of international law were involved. In
the New York courts there were something more than one
hundred twenty-five cases of that character. All of these
cases, gathered together by the industry of Professor Edgar
Turlington, indicate the comparative frequency with which
international law problems confront our courts, and there is
every reason to believe that these cases will grow in frequency with the ever closer international connections and
relationships created by modern science, annihilating as it
does time and space.
As regards international arbitrations, we have had arbitration with Great Britain in thousands of claims since the famous Jay Treaty of 1795 providing commissions to arbitrate
differences between the two nations. Questions arousing bitter national feeling have been arbitrated and the judgments
enforced. After the Civil War an arbitral commission awarded damages for the destruction done by Confederate cruisers
(Alabama claims) and what might have caused war was
settled by the persuasive argument of lawyers and the decree
of arbitrators. In my own time I have seen serious matters
involving the freedom of the seas and the boundaries of nations thus settled - the Bering Sea Arbitration (in 1903),
the Venezuela-Guiana boundary (in 1899), the North Atlantic fisheries (in 1912), the subject of controversy for a
hundred years, and other claims - all of them involving the
application of the rules of international law. Lord Salisbury
felicitously remarked when the fisheries questions were settled that he was glad that an end had come to the controversy, as the words "cod" and "lobster" had been fighting
words between the English-speaking peoples on both sides
of the Atlantic for more than a hundred years.
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Nor is international law of peace any more uncertain than
is our constitutional law and many other domains of our law
in which changes in social conditions and circumstances have
led to the reinterpretation of old precedents and the reformulation of old principles.
The real difficulty to-day is with a comparatively narrow
domain of international law. That domain is the domain of
maritime law, or the law of the sea in times of war. It must
be admitted at once that this sea law is at the present moment in a highly unsettled, vague and unsatisfactory state.
Since the end of the Middle Ages and when modern history
began there has been a necessary, unavoidable conflict of
interest between the neutral and the belligerent on the high
seas. The neutral sought to continue his peaceful trading;
the belligerent sought to destroy all commerce of the other
belligerent and to prevent neutrals from bringing him any
supplies for his military forces. Out of these conflicts there
grew certain, rules, which rules were indeed a compromise
between the rights of the neutral to sail freely upon the high
seas and the right of a belligerent in war to attack his enemy
and to cripple his resources.
The belligerent acted through the blockade of his enemy's
ports and through the stopping of ships carrying supplies to
the enemy of a military character, or of what has long been
termed "contraband"- that is, contrary to the bans or laws.
A blockade had to be real and effective. It was the method
applied by England in the long struggle with the French
Revolution and with Napoleon, and it was stringently applied by the Federal Government to the Southern Confederacy. It contributed in great measure to the destruction of
the Confederacy through depriving it of munitions of war
and of necessary foodstuff. A vessel attempting to run the
blockade was subject to forfeiture both as to the ship and
its cargo.
For the purpose of enforcing belligerent maritime measures
prize courts are part of the judicial system of every maritime
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country. In the United States the function of the prize courts
is devolved by the Constitution upon the federal courts.
It may be interesting here to note that these courts have
dealt with a very large number of prize cases. In 1923 there
were published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace three large volumes containing. the prize cases decided in the United State Supreme Court and including some
cases in the lower courts in which questions of prize law were
involved. These cases were those considered between 1789
and 1918, and the amount of prize law declared by our federal courts generally is second only to that declared and developed by the admiralty courts in Great Britain, which have
since the sixteenth century and throughout the various wars
which have afflicted Europe since that date, been engaged in
dealing with prize law. A great number of cases arose out
of the War of 1812. Many most important precedents were
made during the War Between the States, and some of these
precedents were invoked by the British prize courts as justifying the doctrines of blockade and contraband which they
applied during the World War and which were so criticized
by our State Department and by the public during that
period.
In the early days the number of articles strictly adapted to
war purposes was comparatively small, and there was a more
or less general agreement as to what these articles were. A
neutral vessel carrying contraband could be taken upon the
high seas, the contraband removed and condemned in the
prize court, and if the vessel contained in major portion a
contraband cargo the vessel itself could be condemned.
Nowhere, however, had such difficult and complex questions arisen as during the last World War when the sea power of Great Britain was used to blockade Germany and to cut
off that nation from all access to supplies from all over the
world. Many notes of protest were written by the United
States in regard to alleged violations by the British Govern-
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ment of sea law. Elaborate answers were made by Great
Britain, and lawyers on all sides divided upon difficult problems such as that of continuous voyage, ultimate destination,
taking vessels into port for visit and search, taking off reservists, searching mail, et cetera. The history is long and complicated, but the United States maintained the position that
it had taken during the Napoleonic wars - that it was entitled to trade freely upon the high seas, subject only to certain definite rules as to blockade, contraband, et cetera, as
to which there had been theretofore considerable agreement
among the nations.
At the beginning of the war the United States, Great
Britain and Germany formally stated that they would abide
by a certain code called the Declaration of London. This
code had been drawn up by a convention of ten maritime
powers in pursuance to a resolution of the Hague Convention of 1907. The object of the code was to clarify and make
more precise the rules of sea law. This code was actually ratified by the Senate of the United States, and several of the
others adopted it as part of their naval codes. The House
of Commons in England ratified it, but the House of Lords
finally rejected it on the ground that it did not give sufficient
scope to the naval power of Great Britain in curbing neutral
commerce. Our State Department found it impossible to obtain adherence to this code, and in the early days of the war
announced that America would apply to the action of foreign
belligerents on the high seas the old rules of international law
as laid down by general agreement and the various precedents more or less accepted by the nations.
The emergencies of new conditions of warfare, and notably
the submarine, brought about, as many well remember, a
totally new and unprecedented situation. The submarine
could not, as could a cruiser, bring a neutral vessel into a
foreign port for search and put a prize crew on it and send
it into one of its own ports. In the end the action of the submarine in violation of all past precedent, which had provided
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for the safety of the crew and which save in exceptional circumstances forbade the destruction of the neutral vessel, led
to war between Germany and the United States.
Some attempt has been made as a consequence of the
Washington Conference of 1922 to assimilate the action of
belligerent submarines to that of cruisers and to provide that
the submarine may not destroy a vessel until full opportunity has been given to remove passengers and crew to a place
of safety. In the beginning of this war Germany announced
that it would comply with this standard. I think it has been
pretty well demonstrated, however, that if the submarine is
to be an effective weapon it is impossible to comply with this
standard of elementary humanity. To set passengers and
crew adrift in small lifeboats on the open ocean can by no
stretch of the imagination be assimilated to placing them in
a position of comparative security. The cruiser of former
times was a vessel of some capacity and could take on board
the people of any vessel that it might destroy. Moreover, it
was at that time far less necesssary to destroy vessels, and
under the international law preventing it could only be done
under exceptional circumstances. The custom was to provide
a prize crew and to send the vessel captured into port, there
to be condemned by a prize court.
All these matters were brought into very clear relief by
the case of the American vessel Flint so recently captured by
a German cruiser, manned by a prize crew, sent first to a
Russian port on the Arctic Ocean, expelled from there by
the Russian Government, and finally brought by its prize
crew into a Norwegian port. There Norway interned the
prize crew and turned the vessel over to its original commander. It is reported that the alleged contraband cargo has
been sold and thafthe vessel will return to the United States.
It is hoped that the incident is over, but it certainly aroused
great public interest and has caused a re-examination to be
made of the law of prize. The action of Norway in return-
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ing the vessel to the original owners was, I think, entirely in
keeping with international law and with the soundest precedents.
A very similar situation rose in 1917 in connection with
the case of the Appam. That vessel, a British merchantman
cruising on the west coast of Africa, was captured by a German cruiser, the Moewe, a prize crew placed on board and
also a large number of persons who had been taken from
British merchantmen destroyed upon the high seas by that
cruiser. The Appam was taken by the prize crew into the
harbor of Newport News, and it was announced by the German Government that she was to remain in that harbor during the period of the war. This was claimed as a right arising
out of a treaty with Prussia in 1799. Shortly after her arrival
at Newport News the owner of the Appam filed a libel seeking to recover the Appam upon the claim that holding and
detaining the vessel in American waters was in violation of
the law of nations and of the neutrality of the United States.
As the court said in rendering its opinion returning the Appam to the original British owners:
"The principles of international law recognized by this
Government, leaving the treaty aside, will not permit the
ports of the United States to be thus used by belligerents. If
such use were permitted, it would constitute of the ports of a
neutral country harbors of safety into which prizes captured by one of the belligerents, might be safely brought and
indefinitely kept (The Steamship Appam, 243 U. S. 124)."
The court analyzed the treaty and reached the conclusion
that the exception to the general international rule against
sending prizes into neutral ports could not be held to imply
an "intention to make of an American port a harbor of refuge
for captured prizes of a belligerent government" and that
"such use of one of our ports was in no wise sanctioned by
the Treaty of 1799" with Prussia. The State Department
in an independent examination of the question had reached
the same conclusion as to the interpretation to be placed
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upon the treaty. Curiously enough, in reaching this conclusion they were largely influenced by the examination of the
French text of the treaty which made the matter much clearer than the somewhat ambiguous language of the English
version.
The German Government also referred to Article 23 of
rules adopted at The Hague concerning maritime warfare.
This rule permitted the internment of prizes in neutral harbors, but as the United States in adhering to the convention
generally had made a reservation against the application of
Article 23 the general rule of international law against such
harboring of prizes was applicable.
In the case of the Flint, the vessel not belonging to a belligerent, but being under a neutral flag, no question of the
ownership of the vessel could arise until she was brought before a prize court. If found to contain a cargo of more than
50 per cent. contraband, she might be condemned and her
ownership adjudged to the German Government. This clearly, -however, could only take place upon'proper proof of the
facts of what in international law has been called "infection"
and by the decree of a lawful prize court having jurisdiction
over the vessel. The case of the Appam, a belligerent owned
vessel, was more difficult, so that the counsel for the German
Government vigorously contended that the capture itself of
a merchantman belonging to a belligerent transferred title,
and that even though the Appam were in Newport News in
violation of American neutrality she could not be restored
to her owners as they had lost all ownership by the effect of
capture independent of the judgment of a prize court. In addition, a German prize court had condemned the Appam,
although she was not of course within the jurisdiction of that
court. It will interest students of the law to note that in answer to this claim a special brief was filed on the point that
the capture did not divest the owners of what in Roman law
had been termed the spes recuperandi,or hope of recovery.
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This doctrine had passed into prize law, and to-day stands
vindicated by the Supreme Court of the United States. As
the court said:
"Nor can we consent to the insistence of counsel for appellant that the Prize Court of the German Empire has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the fate of the Appam as lawful prize. The vessel was in an American port and under our
practice within the jurisdiction and possession of the District Court which had assumed to determine the alleged violation of neutral rights, with power to dispose of the vessel
accordingly. The foreign tribunal under such circumstances
could not oust the jurisdiction of the local court and thereby
defeat its judgment * * *. The violation of American neutrality is the basis of jurisdiction, and the Admiralty courts
may order restitution for a violation of such neutrality. In
each case the jurisdiction and order rests upon the authority
of the courts of the United States to make restitutionto private owners for violations of neutrality where offending vessels are within our jurisdiction, thus vindicating our rights
and obligations as a neutral people." (Italics mine.)
It is fortunate as avoiding a serious controversy between
the United States and Germany that Noryay so promptly
and courageously applied the rules of international law as
interpreted by our Supreme Court, despite the protestations
of the German Government.
The difficulties arising during the last war and which have
been the undoubted cause of our recent legislation were of a
two-fold character: First, the application by Great Britain
of a very liberal view of the power to declare goods contraband and of an extended application of the doctrines of continuous voyage and ultimate destination. Barrels of diplomatic ink were spilled over these controversies involving
legal difficulties and subtleties of a most intricate order.
American Civil War cases were invoked to justify the seizure
by British orders of vessels containing foodstuffs destined for
Scandinavian neutrals.
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The doctrine of conditional contraband, that is, that such
material could only be contraband when destined for armed
forces, was refuted by Great Britain on the ground that in
modern totalitarian war you cannot differentiate between
the armed forces and the general population. This view again
was predicated upon wholly changed conditions which were
claimed to have abrogated ancient limitations easily applicable to a different state of affairs. War to-day is not something carried on between certain groups in each nation and
from which the mass of population is largely immune, but
the nations are now so organized as a unit that every individual must do his share in carrying out the nations' warlike will. This has reflected itself in international law and
has made some old precedents unworkable. The controversies
between Great Britain and the United States in these matters furnish most interesting questions for study to the student of international law, but were never submitted to any
international tribunal. Both nations finally agreed to wipe
the slate clean of reciprocal claims arising out of British
maritime operations, and thus most interesting and farreaching questions were never brought to the scrutiny of an
impartial tribunal.. This from the standpoint of international
law was certainly unfortunate.
Of the many cases that came into the British prize courts,
the most interesting and important was that of the Zamora,
finally decided upon appeal by the Privy Council (1916).
This case involved the validity of certain executive orders
of the King in.Council regarding the right to requisition vessels before condemnation by the prize court, and the question
arose whether such orders in council were not in conflict with
settled rules of international law. The court, after very careful consideration of the case, ruled that the said orders were
not in conflict with international law. In reaching that conclusion, however, the whole question of the conflict between
municipal law and international law and questions arising
in the British courts were fully discussed. Reference was
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made to a judgment of Lord Stowell which referred to the
King in Council as possessing "legislative rights" over a
Court of Prize analogous to those possessed by Parliament
over the courts of common law. Even the almost sacrosanct
authority of Lord Stowell was here questioned by Lord Parker in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, for he
said:
"At most this amounts to a dictum, and in their Lordships'
opinion, with all due respect to so great an authority the dictum is erroneous. It is in fact quite irreconcilable with the
principles enunciated by Lord Stowell himself."
He then cites a judgment of Lord Stowell in the case of
The Maria, which contains the following passage:
"The seat of judicial authority is, indeed, locally, here, in
the belligerent country, according to the known law and
practice of nations; but the law itself has no locality. It is the
duty of the person who sits here to determine this question
exactly as he would determine the same question if sitting
at Stockholm; - to assert no pretensions on the part of Great
Britain which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances, and to impose no duties on Sweden, as a neutral
country, which he would not admit to belong to Great
Britain in the same character."
After quoting, Lord Parker continues:
"It is impossible to reconcile this passage with the proposition that the Prize Court is to take its law from Orders in
Council. Moreover, if such a proposition were correct, the
Court might at any time be deprived of the right which is
well recognized of determining according to law whether-a
blockade is rendered invalid either because it is ineffective
or because it is partial in its operation."
Although the decision in this case did not in ultimate analysis necessitate the overriding by the prize court of an order of the king in council, it did clearly enunciate the principle that no such crown prerogative could override a plain
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rule of international law. In the case at bar this conflict was
avoided by the holding that there was no irreconcilable difference between the applicable orders and the rules of international law as laid down in Great Britain and in the United
States.
This case may become of very immediate interest in connection with the order in council just announced making
goods of German origin or ownership subject to seizure on
the high seas. How far such an order prohibiting export in
neutral vessels of German goods may be compatible with
international law was very fully discussed in the diplomatic
correspondence between the United States and Great Britain
during the last war. The arguments on both sides were many
and complicated, and, as I have said, it is perhaps unfortunate that the problem was never submitted to an international tribunal. The situation, however, is illustrative of the fact
that what we now call totalitarian warfare has so largely
changed the situation as to render inapplicable or inadequate
many of the older precedents. It might well be claimed from
a larger and non-technical standpoint that such orders were
justified on the ground that the totalitarian state exercised
control over all private property and therefore property of
German origin or ownership, even in neutral vessels, might
be treated as enemy property everywhere confiscable.
Whether this order establishes a true blockade or not may
indeed be questionable, but certainly many neutral ports in
the North Sea and the Baltic are natural ports of Germany,
and although neutral ports cannot be blockaded under the
existing geographical and economic circumstances, it is not
impossible that very much the same results as that flowing
from a technical blockade may be reached upon other
grounds.
The problems with Germany were of a different character
from the fact that they involved human life rather than
mere property rights, and the continued destruction of neutral lives as well as property by the submarine finally forced
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the United States to belligerent measures against Germany.
The view of the Government of the United States regarding
submarine activity is made evident in the treaty signed at
Washington in February, 1922, between the United States,
Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan relative to the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants at sea in
time of war, et cetera. That treaty was ratified by the Senate
of the United States in March,. 1922. It declares in its
fourth article:
"The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without
violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 19141918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use
of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally
accepted as a part of the law of nations, they now accept
that prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves
and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto."
It is because of this situation as regards sea law, its uncertainty by reason of new conditions, the unwillingness of
a nation like Germany that has submarines but few surface
vessels to adhere to the settled rules, and the consequent
controversy and difficulties that must arise, that the present
cash and carry legislation was enacted. It practically abandons the old doctrine for which the United States fought in
1812 and again in 1917 of the "freedom of the seas." It is
supposed that if the American flag disappears from the belligerent areas no such causes of controversy will arise as in
the past, and thus the nation will more easily escape the dangers of being involved in war.
There is indeed throughout the land every wish to avoid
involvement in war; yet we pay something of a price in renouncing American rights, and certainly some American
prestige and dignity. By withdrawing from the high seas we
leave the field to those who wage war to the uttermost, and
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abdicate those rights admittedly belonging to neutrals under
international law. Whether the system will succeed is a matter of individual opinion on which I express no opinion and
as to which the future alone can tell.
Why was it during the twenty intervening years between
the wars that no effort was made to enact among the nations a code of sea law? For this there are various reasons.
Many believed that a collective system would take the place
of the present international anarchy and that the aggressor
would be judicially determined and that the other nations
would suppress him as an outlaw. In other words, the attempt was made to out-law war. Moreover, it would have
been almost impossible to get an agreement on sea law between Great Britain and the United States on the one hand
and powers like Italy and Germany on the other, which
would have been forced to rely on new engines of war the submarine and the bombing plane - which could not be
fitted into the old categories of international law. An attempt
was made by some private groups, such as the Harvard Research Committee, to declare the law and to set up codes
which might be used by governments in attempting to reach
some satisfactory codification of maritime law. These are
valuable contributions to a better future.
To-day the law is quite as uncertain as it was in 1914.
This does not mean that there is no law, because doubtless,
after the war, as has always happened in the past, tribunals
of arbitration will be established and decisions will have to
be rendered on claims put forth by governments. Our own
government in the preamble to the Neutrality Act expressly
maintains all its national rights, even though it prevents its
own nationals from the exercise of such rights. For the time
being, however, our present law should minimize controversy
by the disappearance of American ships in those parts of
the ocean where belligerents are operating.
A word as to the much mooted question as to whether
in retealing the embargo the United States was doing an
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unneutral act in changing its law during war. I take it that a
nation may during a war in any way limit the exercise of
rights which it possesses under international law by forbidding its citizens to exercise those rights, provided the nation
does so for its interest and protection. What that interest
and protection are, to my mind, is a matter wholly to be determined by the nation itself. Men may differ as to their motives for voting for such a law, but once voted it represents
what our legislators believe to be the interest of the United
States. Under those circumstances I do not see how any such
limitation on our own rights - however wise or unwise may be termed unneutral. Especially is it so when the law returns to the time honored international law of the sea, which
allows neutrals to navigate freely, subject to the rights of
belligerents to create effective blockades if in their power
and to conduct visit and search for contraband and, if found,
consequent condemnation.
This new legislation will undoubtedly create various unforeseen problems. Within a few days of its enactment much
public sentiment was aroused by an announcement that
American passenger and freight ships barred from the European trade were to be registered under the Panama flag so
that they might continue to be of use to their owners and
to the maintenance of international commerce. This from a
practical standpoint might, of course, have greatly minimized the loss to the owners, would have avoided a considerable diminution in trade and have been of the greatest convenience to neutral nations in Europe. On the other hand,
the law would not permit the employment of American seamen, and thousands of men would have remained out of employment despite the transfer of the ships. As to the legality
of such a transfer, it seems to me that there can be little
doubt. The law merely requires that the transfer be bona
fide and that it be authorized by the Maritime Commission.
Such authorization, wholly within the jurisdiction of the
executive, seems to me to be beyond question by the courts
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as an executive or political act with which they will not interfere. The larger question of how far such immediate transfer of registry was compatible with the dignity and moral
standing of the United States is another question, upon
which I vent no opinion.
A further more important and interesting development of
the war situation arises from the Declaration of Panama at
the meeting or congress held by the governments of the twenty-one American Republics last September and October.
That declaration, after reciting the dangers to neutral commerce and the people of neutral states, declared that:
"There is no doubt that the Governments of the American
Republics must foresee those dangers and as a measurQ of
self-protection insist that the waters to a reasonable distance
from their coasts shall remain free from the commission of
hostile acts or from the undertaking of belligerent activities
by nations engaged in a war in which the said governments
are not involved." (Italics mine.)
It is then declared that:
"As a measure of continental self-protection, the American
Republics, so long as they maintain their neutrality, are as
of inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent to
the American continent, which they regard as of primary
concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the
commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation, whether such hostile act be attempted or made
from land, sea or air."
And then follows a definition of these waters extending
along the American.coasts, to a distance in some places of
three hundred miles from the shore.
Such a declaration, if really enforced by the American governments signatory thereto, would indeed be a radical departure from international law. It is quite true that the current belief that territorial waters are limited to three miles
from the coast is not wholly accurate, that nations have
claimed jurisdiction further out, and we have the enforce-
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ment of smuggling regulations and some other police purposes, such as prohibition of the liquor traffic, beyond such
limitation. The three-mile limit was originally founded upon
the ability of cannon, which has since been so greatly extended, as all will remember who happened to be in France
between 1914 and 1918. Nevertheless, with all these enlargements of any three-mile limitation, this declaration far
outranks any claims made in recent times. It is true that the
United States claimed plenary jurisdiction over the Bering
Sea in connection with the protection of the seal herds and
also certain rights for the same purpose in the North Pacific
Ocean. These claims were adjudged adversely to the United
States in the Bering Sea arbitration. Great Britain had long
ago enacted various "hovering acts" to protect what it considered its security in certain circumstances. The most famous of these prevented vessels from hovering within twenty-five miles of St. Helena because of the fear inspired lest
the great captive conqueror should once more regain Europe
and recommence the struggle for mastery of the continent.
To-day the United States is engaged in a serious controversy with Japan involving a claim to halibut and salmon
fishing rights which extend over perhaps one hundred miles
of salt water.
All these, however, are small in comparison with a claim
which would immunize the American continent from belligerent action for hundreds of miles outside its coasts. One
may well sympathize with this attempt to put war as a brutal
and lawless thing far from us. Will it and can it succeed?
Not until the United States and the other American states
are willing to adopt it as part of a defensive policy. The effectiveness of such a defensive policy, at least at first, would
depend wholly upon potential force, but if that force were
so assured it might in time become a recognized doctrine, as
is the Monroe Doctrine, and it might be the effective beginning of a policy for the outlawry of war such as was attempted, alas so ineffectively, in the so-called Pact of Paris,
renouncing war as a policy and declaring that only peaceful
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methods of redress could be sought. Although signed by fiftythree nations this pact so far has been little more than a
declaration of a pious aspiration. That it may bear fruit,
however, in the far future as witnessing the hopes and desires of masses of men throughout the world is not at all impossible.
What is the future of international maritime law in war?
This is indeed a doubtful question. I hesitate to believe that
the nations will ever agree upon some code which will be
certain and precise. The interests of land power and of sea
power of belligerent and neutral are always at variance. Any
code would be a compromise to be violated by the strongest
and only limited by fear of the strength of neutrals. The only
alternative to this otherwise chaotic condition is some system of collective action in effect outlawing war as a legitimate method of pursuing political aims. Until we reach some
such point, a neutral can only save itself from serious international disputes and perhaps war by either abdicating its
rights upon the high seas, withdrawing behind its own boundaries, or by being so strong that no belligerent will dare to
violate. the rights which it asserts belong to it as a neutral
under international law. We in America have apparently
chosen the first course. I trust that it may be successful and
that America may emerge with peace and undiminished influence in the council of nations. But as to this only the future can tell.
As long as the present situation of wholly sovereign states
continues and as long as war is recognized as a legitimate
means of carrying out a national policy, whatever that policy
may be, the conflict between neutral and belligerent interests
will continue. Only when some federative world plan becomes a reality, and it is realized among the nations that
their major interest is in the preservation of peace through
law, .willthis age-long conflict cease.
FredericRene Coudert.
New York, N. Y.

